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Game theory ​

Treat the stakes of a round as fixed at the close and ignore wei rounding. Each cell wins with probability 1/25; let K+ be the cells with stake and K0 the empty ones, so |K+|+|K0|=25.

Expected return ​

Proposition 6 · Expected return

A player's expected HYPE back from a round is

(1)E[xi]=125[ ∑k∈K+si,k(1+(1−φ)T−SkSk)+|K0|(1−φ)ui].

Proof. If a covered cell k wins, the payout formula pays si,k(1+Π/Sk) with Π=(1−φ)(T−Sk). If an empty cell wins, the round is void and pays (1−φ)ui. Average over the 25 equally likely cells. ∎

The fee does not depend on how you bet ​

Corollary 7 · Fee invariant

For every distribution of stakes, the expected fee of a round is 2425φT, and players get back T(1−24φ25) on average. At φ=10% the expected take is 9.6% of the round.

(2)E[F]=φ25[∑k∈K+(T−Sk)+|K0|T]=φ25(|K+|T−T+|K0|T)=2425φT.

The middle step uses ∑k∈K+Sk=T. Where you bet changes your share of the pot and your variance, not the price of playing as a whole.

Corollary 8 · Uniform board

If every cell holds the same stake, Sk=T/25, every player expects ui(1−24φ25), however they split their own stake.

Where a bet pays ​

For a small new stake on a covered cell k, the expected return per unit of stake is

(3)Rk=125[1+(1−φ)T−SkSk+|K0|(1−φ)].

With every cell covered (K0=∅) the bet has a positive expected HYPE return exactly when the cell is less crowded than

(4)Rk>1⟺SkT<1−φ25−φ≈3.614%(φ=10%),

against 4% for a uniform board. This is a parimutuel market: a winning cell is shared by everyone on it, so money is paid for going where it is scarce.

Expected return of a bet by how crowded its cell is
HYPE back per 1 HYPE staked, fee 10%, every cell covered. Below 3.61% of the round a cell pays more than it costs
0.00.51.01.52.02.52%4%6%8%10%12%break-evenuniform board, 4%
Table
Cell's share of the roundExpected return
cell holds 2% of the round1.804 HYPE back per 1 HYPE
cell holds 3% of the round1.204 HYPE back per 1 HYPE
cell holds 3.61% of the round1.000 HYPE back per 1 HYPE
cell holds 4% of the round0.904 HYPE back per 1 HYPE
cell holds 5% of the round0.724 HYPE back per 1 HYPE
cell holds 8% of the round0.454 HYPE back per 1 HYPE
cell holds 12% of the round0.304 HYPE back per 1 HYPE

In the payout example, B's single bet sits on a cell holding 0.2 of 2.6, or 7.7% of the round. B expects −0.0528 per round, −53% of the stake; A expects −0.1968. Together they lose 0.2496=2425⋅0.1⋅2.6 on average, exactly as Corollary 7 says.

Empty cells do not stay empty ​

Proposition 9 · Covering an empty cell

A stake δ on an empty cell has expected profit

(5)E[profit]=(1−φ)T25−δ(1−1+(|K0|−1)(1−φ)25),

where T is the round before the bet. It is positive for every δ<(1−φ)T24−(|K0|−1)(1−φ).

Proof. If the cell wins, the bettor is alone on it and receives δ+(1−φ)T. If another empty cell wins, the round is void and returns (1−φ)δ. Otherwise the stake is lost. ∎

A small bet on an empty cell has a one-in-25 shot at the whole round. In an active market every cell gets covered, void rounds disappear, and the emission is always paid to someone.

Risk of a single position ​

A stake s on one covered cell pays sok with probability 1/25 and nothing otherwise, where ok are the cell's gross odds. Its variance is

(6)Var[x]=s2ok2⋅125⋅2425.

On a uniform board, a position spread evenly over all 25 cells returns ui(1−24φ25) whichever cell wins: its variance in HYPE is zero, and its holder is exposed only to the fee and to the value of the LAUREL it mines. That is the basis of mining.